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BOOK REVIEW
PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS.
By Thomas L. Shaffer. New York:
Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc. 1970. Pp. xi, 292. $7.95.

DEATH,

Most legal writers aspire to be both practical and creative. And yet, as
everyone who has ever tried his hand at legal writing will attest, to a certain extent
practicality and creativity are antagonistic virtues. Too much of one tends to
cancel out the other, resulting in the author's either saying something that most
intelligent readers are likely to know already, or saying something that few intelligent readers are likely to accept as valid or relevant. Success lies in steering a
mid-course between obviousness and unacceptability. And if the task were not
difficult enough under the best of circumstances, there are some subjects with
respect to which no such mid-course is possible. With these subjects, the author
may succeed in being sensibly practical or interestingly creative, but not both
("How to execute a will," or "Why it's fun being a law school dean" come to

mind).
Frankly, I would have supposed that the subject of Professor Shaffer's book,
Death, Property and Lawyers-an attempt to relate. the psychology of testation
to the practice of law-would fall into this difficult category. That is, I would
have supposed that in writing of the ways in which the legal profession might
employ knowledge of the effects of death anxiety upon the disposition of property,
one would inevitably wind up being either practical but obvious, on the one
hand, or creative but unacceptable, on the other. Now, having read Professor
Shaffer's book, I am not so sure.
I say that I am not sure because, at least at a relatively superficial level,
the book quite clearly succeeds in giving the impression of being both practical
and creative; and yet I am uncertain as to whether the same judgment may be
made in substance. Returning to the metaphor of steering a mid-course between
obviousness and unacceptability, I am still not convinced with respect to this
subject that a mid-course actually exists. The author warned at the outset that
he was about to embark upon uncharted seas, containing difficulties both obvious
and hidden. Yet, try as I might, I somehow missed the precise point at which
these difficulties were overcome. It is as though we had safely passed the critical
point in our journey, where the dangers of becoming either obvious or unacceptable were greatest, during an intense fog of extremely short duration. I am left
with a bit of the puzzlement of the grateful traveler who, having followed helpful
instructions and having arrived at his intended destination, still harbors the
suspicion that "you can't get there from here."
Before returning to explore the possible sources of my puzzlement, I shall
briefly describe the contents of what the author himself calls "this curious book."
In a total of seven chapters, five of which have been adapted from previously
published articles, Professor Shaffer presents a series of different contexts in which
lawyers can, and he strongly urges should, take advantage of psychological insights
into human attitudes towards death. Every conscious human being is aware that
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sooner or later he must die; awareness of inevitable death produces fear; fear of
death invites suppression; and suppression of fear causes anxiety. Insisting that
the anxiety produced through suppression of fear of death is pervasive in our
culture and that it represents a source of harmful psychological disorder, the
author asserts that the ownership and disposition of property-especially the
testamentary disposition of -property-signiicantly affects, and is affected by,
attitudes toward death. The relationship between disposition of property and
attitudes toward death is developed in two basic contexts familiar to lawyers:
planning and litigation. These contexts each serve as the focus for discussion in a
pair of chapters, each pair being organized into a separate part (Parts two and
three, respectively) and given an appropriate subtitle (Part one of the book, subtitled "Death" and comprised of three chapters, introduces the reader to the
basics of death psychology).
In the planning context, Professor Shaffer asserts that the client's interaction
with the lawyer in planning the disposition of the client's estate forces both participants honestly to confront the fact of the inevitability of the client's death,
resulting in an experience which allows the client to reduce his level of harmful
death anxiety. The author sees the lawyer assuming the role of psychotherapist,
helping to reconcile the client to his mortality and thus to console him. Recon-

ciliation and consolation come not merely from the client's facing up to death,
but also from the fact that in planning the disposition of his estate, the client in a
sense "defeats" his death, or at least he defeats some of the tangible effects of
death upon his property and his family. The developing psychology of property
ownership suggests that, to a certain extent, the individual equates himself
psychologically with his possessions, and that to the extent of this identification,
"a person is what he owns." It is this identification of possessor and possessed
which gives the estate planning context its unique therapeutic potential:
The wills client, because his confrontation with death involves also a consideration of his property, may tend to regard his property as representing
and, in effect, immortalizing him ....
. . One of the things [he] learns is that death will not rob him of
power ....
... Lawyers who understand [this] are able to help their clients leave the
law office realistically consoled by the discovery that law provides ways to
feed one's children, to continue one's business, and to rob death of some of
its ability to frighten the living.'
*

The author is critical of some lawyers who, he says, "show little concern
about the therapeutic counseling that goes on in an 'estate planning' client's experience."' Amplifying upon this criticism, he later observes that "[L]awyers
cannot perform even everyday psychotherapy for death anxiety if they continue
to treat will-drafting as a form of black magic... with canned forms and tenminute interviews."13 Anticipating the reluctance some lawyers will feel at the
prospect of assuming the role of psychotherapist, he explains:
1 SH"AFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAwYERs
SHAFFER].
2 Id. at 72.
S Id. at 142.

75, 76 and 89 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as
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The question here is not whether the lawyer is a counselor in this relationship, he cannot avoid being a counselor. The question is whether the lawyer
realizes what he is doing, is able to accept what it involves for himself and for
his client, and has the wisdom and courage to be a helpful companion.4
In attempting to relate the psychology of testation to the litigation context,
Professor Shaffer focusses upon two types of cases in which postmortem inquiries
into decedents' prior states of mind are regularly made: cases in which, for federal estate tax purposes, inquiry is made into whether inter vivos gifts by decedents
within three years of death were not, contrary to a statutory presumption, made
"incontemplation of death;" 5 and cases involving will contests in which inquiry
is made into whether testamentary gifts were the product of undue influence.
Professor Shaffer argues that in neither type of case have courts adequately based
their decisions upon available psychological theories regarding human motivations. Instead, courts have resorted either to "unstated, even unconscious [psychological] assumptions which are patently unsound,"" or to "gimmicks such as
presumptions and burden of proof."7 For example, it is clear to psychologists that
frantic physical activity or travel by a decedent shortly before his death probably
indicates the decedent's awareness of impending death and represents a subconscious and futile effort to avoid the inevitable. However, it is precisely such
activity which many courts in the contemplation-of-death cases have accepted as
convincing proof that the decedent could not have been motivated by thoughts
of death during the period in question.8
The sense of creativity which the book conveys is very much a product of
the author's methodology and style. Obviously he has attempted, I believe largely
successfully, to break away from traditional modes of legal writing. His style is
easy and literate, and sprinkled with quotations from creative works of literature
which he uses effectively in helping to clarify difficult or abstract ideas. Sources
include not only traditional legal and psychological writings, but original and
independent field work conducted by the author. To allow his readers to begin to
develop their own sensitivities concerning death attitudes and anxieties, he supplies an edited transcript of a group encounter session in which the dominant
subject is death and the participants' attitudes toward death. In an effort to
substantiate hypotheses concerning the attitudes and expectations of potential
wills clients, he reports the results of a questionnaire designed and administered
to provide interesting and useful data. Edited transcripts of wills interviews are
combined with commentary to support and develop hypotheses concerning the
psychological dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship in the estate planning
context.
If the book suffers from any deficiency in organization or style, it is a
tendency for the various chapters not quite to fit together into an integrated
whole, perhaps reflecting the fact that most of them were first written for separate
4
5

Id. at 72.

6

INT. REV. COD oF
SHAFFER at 202.

7
8

Id. at 261.
See cases cited in

1954, § 2035.

SHAFFER

at 162 and 163 nf. 39-46.
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publication. However, the author has done a commendable job of selecting,
arranging and, where absolutely necessary, rewriting the pieces which make up
the various chapters. The difficulty-perhaps the impossibility--of finally and
totally integrating them does not constitute a substantial barrier to the book's
effectiveness.
Assuming that this description of Professor Shaffer's book is reasonably accurate, it remains my task to answer, if I can, the question raised at the beginning
of this review. Does the book manage substantively to combine the virtues of
practicality and creativity? I must emphasize the word "substantively" here,
because there can be no question that the author has produced an interesting
and provocative book. What I seek to uncover in the discussion which follows is
whether, in addition to the author's very readable style and his intriguing recapitulation of theories of death psychology, he is saying anything of creative
substance to his lawyer-readers concerning the way they should approach the
practice of law. One interpretation of the substance of what he has said would,
in the final analysis, find him being quite practical but not very creative, and
therefore subject to the criticism of merely stating the obvious. Psychological
terminology and Hoosier wit aside, all that he may be saying substantively is that
lawyers who plan estates ought to be aware that their clients fear death and are
uncomfortable talking about it, and that the estate planning experience is both
psychologically traumatic and potentially consoling. 9 And in the litigation context, he may simply be criticizing lawyers for not bringing the behavioral and
psychological sciences sufficiently to bear upon the decision of certain cases, leaving
to traditional methods the task of integrating these truths into the adjudicative
process. If this is the substance of what he is saying, then he deserves polite thanks,
but hardly excited shouts of praise, from his lawyer-readers. He has said what
should have been, and hereafter surely will be, obvious to us all. Viewed in
this manner, the sense of creativity which the book achieves, especially in relation
to the lawyer's role as counselor, is largely superficial, extending way beyond the
substance of what he is saying. The more complex empirical analyses contained in
the book are certainly justified as interesting examples of psychological "art for
art's sake," and I would recommend them to anyone wishing to broaden his
perspective in the fascinating area of psychological attitudes towards death and
property. But professionally, for the lawyer, they constitute something of a dead
end.
My purpose here is not to belittle the book unnecessarily insofar as it is
susceptible to what might be called the conservative interpretation of accomplishing little more in substance than telling lawyers to be more sensitive to the psychological impact they have upon their clients, and perhaps trying to help them
to increase their sensitivity. Such a message is valid and certainly warrants repetition. It is simply that I believe (along with Professor Shaffer) 10 that most good
9 There are several places where the author speaks of the purpose of his book in a way
consistent with this more conservative interpretation; e.g., SHAFFER at 57:
[I]f this book is of any value to you it will be in encouraging you to feel what clients
feel in the testamentary situation. You need empathy, feelings of your own, to bring
that off.
10 E.g., SHAFFER at 264: "The best guidance and support [for troubled clients) probably
come from lawyers who intuitively appreciate and enter into . . . a transference relationship."
(Emphasis added.)
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lawyers know this without being told, and that the other kind of lawyers are not
going to learn it from a book, especially a book as technically complex and as
scholarly as this one. If the author intended nothing more than to urge lawyers
in need of urging that they should be more sensitive toward their estate planning
clients, he could have said it much more effectively than this.
Upon reflection I am inevitably compelled in the direction of a less conservative interpretation of the substance of Professor Shaffer's book, one in which,
to a marked degree, he goes beyond reiteration of the obvious and prescribes a
very untraditional ideal toward which the legal profession should begin consciously to strive. Beyond merely advocating that lawyers become more sensitive
to their clients' feelings, I interpret the author to be urging lawyers consciously
to become psychotherapists to the limits of their capabilities. Replying to the
hypothetical objection that lawyers do not have enough time to offer clients the
type of extended therapeutic counseling that he advocates, Professor Shaffer
offers this revealing reflection upon the lawyer's role as he would like to see it
develop:
In any event, we lawyers are obviously willing to give the wealthy as much
time as the complexity of their problems demands, and we should be willing
to consider the possibility that their problems may include anxieties about
death, identifications with property, and hang-ups in the family ....
. ..If lawyers are willing to do a humane job for middle-class wills
clients (and even for poor ones), but have, despite professional good will,
serious problems in finding enough time to do what is required, then we
academics and the commercial "estate planning" industry should turn our
attention to the human depth of will and trust preparation, and provide our
busy brethren in the field with concise, dependable empirical and secondary
behavioral information. I hope that this little book can be regarded as at
least a contribution and a stimulus in that effort. 1
In keeping with this philosophy, Professor Shaffer is clearly suggesting that
will interviews should be long enough to permit maximum therapy, even if the
extra time is not justified solely as it relates to the lawyer's drafting of the necessary instruments. To be sure, the author undoubtedly knows that he is not going
to alter the behavior patterns of the profession overnight. But there can be little
doubt that he wants to see basic and important shifts in the way lawyers-even
good ones-approach their wills practice. Presently, lawyers fail to function as
psychotherapists not because they should not so function, but because they cannot,
at least given current limitations of training and expertise. The obvious cure for
this deficiency, however, is not difficult to anticipate. In the not-too-distant
future, one may expect courses, available both in law school and on a continuing
education basis, designed to give lawyers the basic tools with which to function
as competent psychotherapists in a whole range of counseling contexts.
And it is no less obvious to me that in the litigation context, as well as in the
planning context, the author is not entirely content with what I earlier described
as the conservative objective of making psychological insights generally available
to courts, to be integrated, where found to be helpful, into the adjudicative
11

SHAFFER at 10 and 11.
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process by traditional means. I shall return shortly to analyze the author's
somewhat ambiguous suggestions for reform in the way in which "decedents'
motivation" cases are decided. Suffice it to say for present purposes that in
placing the "gimmick" label on such time-honored judicial institutions as policybased presumptions and burden of proof, 2 the author quite clearly signals that
his impatience, whatever it may eventually spawn by way of suggested change,
runs deeper than mere petty annoyance.
Accepting for purposes of analysis that my less conservative reading of
Professor Shaffer's book is an appropriate interpretation, what the author is
saying is the furthest thing imaginable from obvious-it is unquestionably and
provocatively creative. But in so dramatically avoiding criticism for having stated
the obvious, has he said something that is valid? Is this more radical blending
of the practice of law and the psychological sciences acceptable? I think not.
I should hasten to point out that my rejection of Professor Shaffer's thesis is
based upon philosophical, rather than practical, grounds. My point here is not to
insist that lawyers are incapable of consciously functioning as psychotherapists,
or that they are unlikely so to function in the foreseeable future. I am more than
ready to agree for purposes of discussion that the profession could so develop,
if only gradually, were adequate efforts made. Therefore, the point I shall try to
make here is not that lawyers cannot become psychotherapists, but that they
ought not become psychotherapists-that the roles of lawyer and psychotherapist
are irreconcilably distinct and philosophically at odds with one another in a way
which inevitably forces one to choose between them. Moreover, I believe this
fundamental distinction between lawyer and psychotherapist to be important
enough to warrant a somewhat extended effort on my part to advance it by way
of rebuttal of what I believe to be the proper interpretation of what Professor
Shaffer has said. Viewed in this manner, the book speaks to lawyers about a
most fundamental shift in the way they approach the practice of law, and as such
it deserves whatever efforts are necessary to put it into proper perspective.
The distinction of which I speak, like any distinction rooted in first principles,
may be illustrated in countless ways and on many levels of abstraction. As
Professor Shaffer's book makes abundantly clear, the foundation of the psychotherapist's relationship with his patient is acceptance of the patient for what he
is, without indulging professionally in normative judgments. First and always the
psychotherapist understands and accepts the patient.' 3 The world with which he
is professionally concerned is the empirical world, in which normative judgments
have a way of doing more harm than good. In stark contrast, the lawyer's instinct
properly should be to resist the "is" in favor of the "ought." The rock bottom
essence of the lawyer's role is, as an officer of the judicial and legal system in
which he functions, precisely to do what the psychotherapist does not-to make
normative judgments concerning the world around him, including his client and
his client's values.
I do not for a moment intend to suggest that the lawyer constantly sits in
stem judgment of his client. My point earlier was that most lawyers know better
12
13

Id. at 261.
See the first nine steps in successful therapeutic counseling in SisApizm at 95.
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than to do anything as foolish as that. However, I do insist that what distinguishes the lawyer from other professional counselors is his normative judgmental
function, no doubt exercised subtly and with tact, but exercised nevertheless
"when the chips are down." Deep at the very core of his being, the lawyer's role
is not to accept or to understand, but to evaluate and to advise. He is not forced
at every turn to choose between these two functions, and a good lawyer takes
every opportunity to combine them. But when forced to choose, as I insist he
often will be forced, the lawyer's choice is clear. The client pays for and should
receive judgment and advice, even at the expense of acceptance and understanding.
Perhaps concrete illustrations will serve to clarify this distinction. It will be
recalled from an earlier description of Professor Shaffer's thesis that the therapeutic
potential of the estate planning experience inheres in the availability to the client
of power which he may exercise after his death through the terms of his estate
plan. "[The] promise of influence after death . .. is the psychological center of
'estate planning.' "14 The book also makes abundantly clear that often, the more
arbitrary and egocentric the client's exercise of this power, the greater the therapeutic potential. The author describes research by psychologists working with
terminally ill patients, and suggests that "[i]n fact, detailed, mundane, and totally
illogical plans for the future are a means of escaping or perhaps repressing death
anxiety."' 5 Later, in discussing the possible relevance of Freud's "Faecal Theory"
of infantile development, he explains:
The faecal theory explains how it is that a man expresses himself in giving or
refusing to give. It explains how a man can identify with what he owns ....
My main difficulty with the faecal theory is that I cannot trace it ...
from specific articles such as heirlooms . . . to wealth-to the economic
power and security one has, and to the tyranny one can exercise with intangible property.'
Assuming that I am right, and that the therapeutic potential of the estate
planning experience will often be increased through the implementation of
arbitrary, egocentric property arrangements," it is clear to me that the lawyer-astherapist would owe the client a duty to accept and understand this potential,
and to see that it is realized. Yet it seems no less clear to me that the lawyer-aslawyer would in this situation owe the client (and his family) exactly the opposite duty-i.e., the duty to make a normative judgment that such a plan is unreasonable and to do everything in his power (including, finally, being critical of
the client's desires) to "sell" a more reasonable (less egocentric) plan to his
14 Id. at 73.
15 Id. at 77.
16 Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
17 The high water mark of psychotherapeutic consolation through estate planning must be
the English testator who directed that the income from his estate each year be changed into sixpence and thrown on his grave, to be scrambled for by the old women of his home town. The
mind boggles at the therapeutic effect that the execution of his will must have achieved in consoling the testator regarding his mortality. It is also interesting, though hardly surprising, that
the eminent legal scholar from whom I received this priceless gem referred to it (obviously
applying an objective standard and unquestionably insensitive to the therapeutic aspects) as
"the nadir of trusts of this kind." See 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS 2860 (1967).
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client."' Thus, in the difficult but not so unusual case, the lawyer's role and the
psychotherapists' role conflict, and in my view the former must eventually prevail.
I believe this is how lawyers do function presently, and it is basically how I think
they ought to function.
I am sure that in reply to what I have just said, Professor Shaffer would
point to a number of places in his book where he makes it clear that he is in
favor of "humane" property arrangements, and I am willing to read normative
standards into his ambiguous phrase." But I remain puzzled, as I stated at the
outset, over how he can have it both ways-i.e., how he can insist upon achieving
estate plans which conform to generally shared views of what is right and proper,
and at the same time urge an approach on the part of lawyers which would, in
the final analysis, subordinate normative judgment to therapeutic potential. As
I see it, if the lawyer's duty really is to provide his client with "humane" plans,
and if maximum therapy often lies (as I believe it will) in the direction of indulging the client in "inhumane" property arrangements, then the lawyer's role
as lawyer must inevitably conflict with his role as psychotherapist. A choice must
finally be made-the objectives of "humaneness" and psychotherapy cannot both
be maximized.
If in the final analysis Professor Shaffer agrees with me that the lawyer's
role as lawyer should prevail over his role as psychotherapist, then we are back

where we began, i.e., telling lawyers something most of them already know: to be
"gentle, but firm." If Professor Shaffer does not agree with me philosophically,
and insists that the lawyer's role as psychotherapist should prevail (or even

somehow that it should be given "equal weight"), then he is advocating a fundamental and radical departure from tradition that I could never accept.
The closest the author comes to confronting the essence of this "role conflice" between lawyer-as-lawyer and lawyer-as-therapist comes mid-way through

his treatment of the planning content, where he urges lawyers to adopt toward
their wills clients the "experimental mode of inquiry" developed by behavioral
scientists:
18 Obviously, the important word here is "reasonable." With it, I mean to refer to a whole
range of normative values, including what I believe to be the modem trend toward a recognition of the legal and moral rights of the surviving family to a portion of the estate. Moreover,
current thinking is clearly in the direction of removing the testator as much as possible from the

decisions that occur after his death, and replacing him with a fiduciary broadly empowered

with discretion to act for the benefit of the family. I equate "egocentric" plans with nineteenthcentury images of the "dead hand." Even today, to be sure, the testator has the legal "right" to

be egocentric; but I insist the lawyer has the professional "duty," which he owes not just to
the testator but in a real sense to the testator's spouse and children, to resist him on that score.
19 Of course, my notion of "reasonableness" is no less ambiguous, but it is ambiguous in a
different way. At least my standard is clearly meant to be objective. Professor Shaffer's standard,

on the other hand, may very well be subjective, in the sense that each testator's own personal

desires establish what would be a "humane" plan for him. This tendency toward ambiguity

(objective vs. subjective, normative vs. empirical) permeates the author's treatment of his entire
subject, and I make numerous references to it throughout this review. A good example of it in
the present context occurs on page 97 of the book, where, having emphasized that the client's
desires and feelings should be accepted and understood by the lawyer, he suggests that "young-

family clients eventually come to a realization that their small wealth must be applied for minor
children.. ." (emphasis supplied). The ambiguity for me stems from the fact that he does not
mention the lawyer's role in bringing about this realization, nor does he pose a case which tests
the normative content of the "must" here. Clearly, he is positing clients who do want to benefit
their children, but who start off thinking impractically in terms of assuring their children's
college educations.
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The '!experimental mode of inquiry" also excludes narrow value systems
which reflect what the lawyer thinks the client should do with his property.
At the very least, an openness to the client's own feelings and values about
property and family requires that the lawyer realize that he communicates his
values and attitudes to the client, whether he wants to or not. It may be that
a life-estate trust for the client's wife is, in the lawyer's opinion, a poor idea.
But the value of the idea should be tested against the way the client feels
about his wife, about-for instance-her remarriage after his death, and
about her ability to plan for and support their children. It should not be
based on a moral absolute which represents the lawyer's own feelings and
values.20
The quoted language could not have been better phrased to prevent a meaningful
confrontation between the roles of lawyer and psychotherapist. The author's
choice of "a moral absolute representing the lawyer's own values" as a target of
criticism in the last sentence eliminates any chance the reader might otherwise
have had of being forced to choose sides in response to the truly difficult case.
Of course, the lawyer should not impose his own values absolutely-does the
author honestly believe many lawyers do that? But what of the more realistic
situation, for example, in which the client's desires may be said to be unreasonably
egocentric when judged by general societal norms? The first sentence of the
quoted passage comes closer to answering that one-and in a manner consistent
with my interpretation that the author is subordinating the "rightness" of the plan
to the therapeutic potential of planning to the client.
Taken as a whole, the quoted passage clearly reveals what I have described
as the puzzling ambiguity of the book. Either it is a restatement of a sensible
truth, i.e., that the lawyer should be more "open to the client's feelings," in which
case I find the passage obvious and unexceptional; or (as I believe) it is a somewhat obfuscated call to the lawyer to defer, in the final showdown, legalistic
values in favor of therapeutic understanding and acceptance, in which case I
find the substance of the passage unacceptable.
One more illustration of this inherent conflict between the roles of lawyer
and psychotherapist will serve to make clear my philosophical difference with
Professor Shaffer concerning the role that lawyers should play in advising their
clients. In a very interesting portion of a later chapter dealing with the subject of
transference as it relates to the adjudication of undue influence cases, the author
quotes at length from Dr. K. R. Eissler's book, The Psychiatrist and the Dying
Patient, in which the therapist-author describes his relationship with a middleaged, female patient. The psychiatrist and patient were very close, and entered
into a relationship in which the psychiatrist became the only person whom the
patient trusted and upon whom the patient relied psychologically. Having undergone a battery of physiological tests at the psychiatrist's suggestion, the woman
was found to be terminally ill. The examining internist did not tell the patient of
his findings, agreeing with the psychiatrist that such information should be withheld. During the months that followed, the psychiatrist repeatedly assured the
woman that the condition for which she had been tested was completely benign.
20

SHAFFER

at 98 and 99 (emphasis added).
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I shall let Dr. Eissler relate in his own words the portion of the story of particular
relevance to our present discussion:
the patient had told me that if she
Shortly after her return from 0knew she were dying, she would change her will instantly and distribute
part of the money which had been allocated in a previous will to her quasiadopted daughter to other relatives, who were in need of financial assistance.
But since she was assured that her sickness was benign, she did not see any
reason to proceed in a hurry. Pointedly--and evidently in order to test meshe added that she was certain that I, since I had never let her down, would
tell her to make a will now if her life were in danger. A decision to make
myself instrumental in the preservation of the patient's illusion of approaching recovery thus might have had detrimental consequences for some of her
relatives, inasmuch as they would obtain less of her estate if she died prior
to executing a new will. However, I decided that the patient's mental and
emotional welfare had to be my paramount goal even though, if all circumstances were known to the members of her family, I would be liable to the
justified complaints of those who might be injured by the patient's premature
death. I am fully aware that I might be censured by some members of the
medical and juridical professions for such an opinion, but I do not see how a
different decision can be made if the patient's welfare is made the physician's
uppermost goal, which, after all, it should be.2
No story concerning the therapist-patient relationship could more vividly
serve to illustrate what I see as the intrinsic difference between the roles of lawyer
and psychotherapist. Dr. Eissler himself admits in the quoted passage that he
would be liable to the justified complaints of the family, and that some lawyers
and psychiatrists might censure him. And yet several pages later, Professor
Shaffer comments in reference to Dr. Eissler's story that:
[Slound medical technique, in his opinion, presented him with no alternative
to putting the patient in a situation where she was motivated to make what
lawyers have for years called an "unnatural" will. This was true despite
complete innocence ... on the part of the doctor.22
I submit that "sound legal technique" would never have presented a lawyer
analogously situated with "no alternative" to allowing the client to leave an unnatural will. The "complete innocence" of which Professor Shaffer speaks is an
innocence which can have its source only in the whatever-helps-the-patient world
of the dedicated psychotherapist. The point here is that the lawyer ought never
put himself in a position sufficiently analogous to that of the doctor in this case
so as to raise a similar dilemma. It ought always be open to the lawyer to take
a middle course between telling the client she is terminally illand telling her, in
effect, that she need not change her will. Once the personal relationship becomes
so intense that it interferes with the lawyer's giving his client even minimally
sound legal counsel, I submit that a sense of professional responsibility should
compel the lawer to advise her to seek other, more objective legal advice. For a
lawyer to act as this doctor acted would be for the lawyer to act unethically.
21
22

Id. at 221.
Id. at 225.
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Although Dr. Eissler's case is extreme, I offer no apologies for making use of
is, for it is precisely the extreme case that illustrates most clearly the essential
difference between the roles of lawyer and psychotherapist which I believe
Professor Shaffer has glossed over. It is one thing to accept the goal of the
psychotherapist to be that of putting the psychological welfare of the patient
before all else, and to condone such conduct as a medically legitimate means to
that end. By no stretch of one's wildest imagination, however, should the same
goal, or conduct, be advocated for legal counselors. I do not mean to suggest that
Professor Shaffer anywhere in his book expressly advocates that lawyers should
behave as did the doctor in this story. I do insist, however, that this is the clear
implication of any serious call for lawyers to begin to act consciously as psychotherapists, and I feel compelled to object at the outset, long before the extreme
case inevitably presents itself.
Turning briefly to the author's treatment of the litigation context, one should
observe that here, too, the dominant theme reflected in the book is a replacement
of value judgment with empirical judgment. I alluded earlier to Professor
Shaffer's deprecating reference to policy-based presumptions as "gimmicks."
It is clear to me that he would like to see contemplation-of-death and undue
influence cases decided less by resort to policy and more by reliance upon modern
psychological theories concerning human motivation. My reaction to this suggestion is twofold: first, as one may have guessed from my reactions regarding
the lawyer's role as adviser, I am not nearly so uncomfortable as he seems to be
with the idea of policy and ultimate values playing a large role in the decision of
these cases, and I suspect from some of the things he has said that at times he may
not be able to tell the difference between value judgment and empirical judgment
when he sees it; and second, despite receiving a rather vague assurance from the
author to the 9ontrary,2 I am fairly certain that the move towards greater empirical sophistication which he advocates would inevitably and unhappily force
lawyers practicing in this area to become much more dependent upon experts in
psychology.
.!
I can best illustrate the validity of my reactions by a brief reference to

Professor Shaffer's analysis of a specific problem raised in the book. In his discussion of contemplation-of-death cases, the author describes one type of recurring
fact pattern in which courts, faced with property transfers which a layman would
describe as "vindictive," have held the vindictiveness accompanying the transfers
to establish a life, rather than a death, orientation, and have accordingly found
the gifts not to have been made in contemplation of death." The author refers
to psychological studies which reveal that some vindictive transfers are focally
suicidal, and suggests that suicidal frames of mind ought to be held to be within
the statutory phrase, "contemplation of death":
23 Reacting favorably to a judicial opinion which takes advantage of psychological insights
in deciding a gift in contemplation-of-death question, the author remarks:
The... court did not, on the other hand, surrender its decision to the "experts." That
would have added a new chapter to the long, unwholesome list of judicial problems
which are falsely centered on a misuse of a psychiatric and psychological information
... [P]sychology as it is presently derived in the adversary system, through adversary
expert witnesses, often dilutes its scientific integrity, and does not serve the law well.
SHAYFER at 202 & 203.
24 See cases cited in SHAFFER at 177 n. 73.
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The reasoning [which the courts should adopt in deciding these cases] would
be this: (1) the transferor identified himself in some significant way with
his property; (2) he transferred his property in a suicidal frame of mind;
(3) suicidal frames of mind are within the statutory phrase "contemplation
of death." . . . Point 3 is a conclusion 2based
on inquiry but applied more or
5
less generally: it is a "legislative fact.
I have no quarrel with the notion that courts ought to re-evaluate their assumptions regarding vindictive transfers in light of the psychological insights regarding focally suicidal transfers. However, I do object to the author's explanation
of how this re-evaluation will be implemented. Contrary to what he may have
said elsewhere about not surrendering decision to the experts, his "Points I and 2"
are most certainly going to require a far greater dependence upon experts in
psychology. And lest his lawyer-readers underestimate the thicket of psychological
jargon that may be visited upon them, Professor Shaffer supplies a truly staggering display in the form of one eminent suicidologist's division of death attitudes
into four major psychological categories with no fewer than fourteen subcategories.26 Moreover, contrary to his characterization of it as "legislative fact,"
"Point 3" most certainly is a value judgment to be made by the court in light
of the policies held to underly the contemplation-of-death statute. In deciding
what meaning to attach to the statutory phrase, "contemplation of death," the
courts should not, as the author suggests they should, ask the advice of psychologists.
The failure of Professor Shaffer's analysis of the implications of his approach
to the litigation context is exemplified by the analysis of the same contemplationof-death problem by a clinical psychologist, Dr. Robert S. Redmount (who is also
a lawyer), whom Professor Shaffer invites to join him in responding to a hypothetical fact pattern. Having described the "procedural" way in which a court
typically approaches these cases, with factual evidence on both sides of the contemplation issue giving the court great latitude to decide the case either way,
Dr. Redmount explains:
Contemplation from a substantive point of view may be another matter.
And, it may be more properly and reasonably the province of the psychologist who truly seeks to examine behavior than of the jurist whose essential
effort and responsibility is to somehow pass judgment.27
The beauty of this passage is that it succeeds in bringing together everything
that has been said by way of critical analysis in this review of Professor Shaffer's
book. I could not agree more with Dr. Redmount's statement that the jurist's (I
would expand it, of course, to include the lawyer's) responsibility is "somehow to
pass judgment." However, I react to it oppositely. Instead of de-emphasizing
this judgmental role in the counseling and adjudication contexts, I would emphasize it. There is more than a little conceit of the "only knower of truth" in
Dr. Redmount's phrase "the psychologist who truly seeks to examine behavior,"
25
26
27

Id. at 191.
Id. at 150-52.
Id. at 180.
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which, frankly, I find distasteful.28 The very same point is echoed several pages
later in Professor Shaffer's comment on the same hypothetical case, "[I]t is
perfectly obvious that courts do not with any sincerity or seriousness attempt to
find out what the dead man's intention was."'2 9
It is not so much what these men are saying as how they are saying it that
reveals the basic error to which they both fall prey. They appear to have lost
sight of the fact that the ultimate goal of the courts in every case involving a
decedent's prior motivations ought to be to try to reach results that are by and
large consistent with the policies and values underlying the particular rule, not
necessarily to characterize a dead man's intent with clinically accurate precision.
This is essentially the point I made earlier in my discussion of the proper role of
the lawyer as counselor. The clinical psychologist's goal is to achieve empirical
understanding; the lawyer's goal is to render normative judgments. The behavioral scientist is interested in measuring and determining human motivation
as an end in itself; the jurist, only to the extent that such a determination
demonstrably helps in reaching right results. If the courts are floundering in
trying to decide the contemplation-of-death cases, my lawyer's instinct tells me it
is not the fact-finding, but the policy-determining that is in need of reworking.
If the values sought to be implemented by the contemplation-of-death concept
cannot be articulated in a more precise way, then perhaps the concept itself should
be abandoned." ° In any event, I am reasonably sure that the answer here does
not lie in bringing the psychologists in to tell either judge or jury what it means
to "contemplate death."
I began this review of Professor Shaffer's provocative book with the observation that I was not sure that a middle course existed here between the twin
dangers of being obvious or being unacceptable. In light of the foregoing analysis,
I am ready to assert with a fair degree of confidence that no such mid-course
exists. To the extent that the book says something practically useful to lawyers,
I find it tending toward the obvious; and to the extent that it says something
creatively different about how law should be practiced, I find it unacceptable.
If my analysis is correct, then it is the subject itself, and not Professor Shaffer's
treatment of it, which forces this conclusion. And to the extent that his subject is
fairly typical of a growing number of others which attempt to bring the behavioral
sciences to bear upon the law, perhaps we are here dealing with what could be
called an "inherent limitation" of this particular art form.
There are at least two ways in which I may have been unfair to the author
in my critical analysis of this book. First, in dwelling upon the substance of what
Professor Shaffer has said, I have undoubtedly failed adequately to convey a sense
of the charm, vitality, and the excitement of the book. Rarely have I read a work
of this sort where the author's personality was so vividly and candidly projected.
This is an interesting book, an informative book and a book well worth every
lawyer's time to read and react to.
The second possibility of error on my part goes to substance. There may, in
28 The author seems to have hit it when he states, "Psychologists . . . have a snobbery of
their own ..
" Id. at 11.
29 Id. at 188.
30 Id. at 150 (Point 1).
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fact, be a mid-ground here, the existence of which has eluded me. I leave it to
my readers to read Professor Shaffer's book and decide for themselves. In any
event, the nature of my criticism is such that it would not be met by, the suggestion that lawyers should be "a little bit like psychotherapists," or "threequarters like psychotherapists." For me, this is a fish-or-cut-bait situation. The
distinction I have tried to elucidate is one which goes to the very heart of the
professional lawyer's image of himself, his role, and his responsibility. It should
not be glossed over, even in the interest of urging lawyers to be more sensitive
and considerate toward the feelings of their wills clients. If I may justifiably be
accused of putting words into Professor Shaffer's mouth, then at least he shares
the blame for being ambiguous enough to have allowed me honestly and in good
faith to comn-it such an error. I can only hope that the polarization of our
positions has brought some further, clarity to this interesting and important
subject.
James A. Henderson, Jr.*

* A.B., Princeton, 1959; LL.B., Harvard, 1962; LL.M., Harvard, 1964; Member, Florida
and Massachusetts Bars. The author is Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law.
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